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We  suggest  in  this  paper  that  the  risk-adjusted 
rate  of  return  on  German  savings  could  be 
improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for 
Germany  (designated  DESWF),  which  could 
invest excess German savings globally. Creation 
of  a  DESWF  should  of  course  complement—and 
not  substitute—for  policies  helping  current 
account adjustment and funding through private 
sector capital flows. 
or  most  of  the  time  since  the  early  1950s, 
national savings in Germany have tended to 
exceed  national  investment,  resulting  in  a 
current  account  surplus.  Most  of  these  excess 
savings have been intermediated by the domestic 
banking  system,  which  has  had  difficulties 
investing  these  German  surpluses  abroad  given 
that  it  is  prohibited  by  law  from  taking  any 
exchange  rate  risk.  This  tended  to  keep  the 
surplus within limits most of the time (less than 1-
2%  of  GDP).  With  the  advent  of  the  euro, 
however, German surpluses could become much 
larger and seem now to have become structurally 
engrained at 6% of GDP, or over one-quarter of 
savings. Since the start of the euro crisis, German 
private savers have repatriated their investments – 
effectively  unloading  their  exposure  onto  the 
public  sector  as  German  banks  have  deposited 
hundreds of billions of euro at the Bundesbank. 
These funds are being lent by the ECB to banks in 
the  euro  area  periphery  (at  75  bps)  –  ensuring 
effectively a negative real return.  
In the period before EMU, German excess savings 
exerted  upward  pressure  on  the  nominal 
exchange rate of the D-Mark. As the exchange rate 
has appreciated unevenly, with periods of relative 
stability  interchanging  with  periods  of  rapid 
appreciation, the real economy suffered numerous 
exchange  rate  shocks.  In  periods  of  rising 
exchange rates, slowing export growth tended to 
reduce  the  current  account  surplus  but  it  also 
dampened  GDP  growth  and  raised 
unemployment.  Conversely,  in  periods  of 
exchange rate stability, accelerating export growth 
tended  to  lead  to  growing  current  account 
surpluses  but  also  to  stronger  GDP  growth  and 
lower unemployment. 
This  pattern  was  interrupted  in  the  wake  of 
unification  when  consumption  and  construction 
booms  in  the  new  Länder  led  to  overspending. 
The  1990s  were  thus  characterised  by  current 
account deficits, which persisted during the first 
years of EMU, although monetary union had the 
effect  of  stabilising  Germany’s  nominal  effective 
exchange  rate.  Since  inflation  remained  well 
under  control,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate 
even  exhibited  a  trend  towards  depreciation. 
During  the  early  2000s,  however,  the  impact  of 
unification  was  finally  overcome  and  the  old 
pattern of excess savings reasserted itself and the 
current account surplus returned, rising to about 
6% of GDP. As a result, the country has cumulated 
surpluses  of  about  €1,200  billion  over  the  last 
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decade  (calculated  to  Q1  2012).  Until  the 
beginning  of  the  euro  crisis,  the  ‘funding’,  or 
rather  the  investment  of  the  current  account 
surplus was no problem. The absence of exchange 
rate  risk  encouraged  German  capital  flows  to 
other  EMU  member  countries.  The  common 
currency  had  eliminated  the  impediments  to 
larger  current  account  surpluses  which  had 
existed during the DM era.  
The Eurosystem steps in 
As the sovereign debt and banking crisis took the 
euro  area  in  its  grip,  the  appetite  of  German 
private investors for euro area public and private 
debt diminished sharply.  
Investment  outside  the  euro  area  was  not  an 
alternative  given  that,  as  mentioned  earlier,  a 
large part of German savings are intermediated by 
banks, which cannot take any exchange rate risk. 
Moreover, the experience with supposedly AAA 
securities  in  the  US  (based  on  subprime 
mortgages) and the losses in Iceland and Eastern 
Europe  increased  the  aversion  of  German 
institutional  investors  to  investment  abroad. 
Hence,  German  savers  and  financial  institutions
developed  a  strong  home  bias.1  To  avoid  a 
breakdown  of  the  financial  system,  the  public 
sector  has  now  had  to  intermediate  German 
savings surpluses. Apart from limited loans by the 
German  government  (and  other  governments  of 
countries with large external surpluses) to Greece 
directly and via the euro rescue fund (EFSF soon 
ESM)  to  the  three  countries  with  a  ‘Troika’ 
programme,  the  Eurosystem  became  the  main 
intermediary  of  savings  from  surplus  to  deficit 
countries.  Its  role  is  reflected  in  the  imbalances 
within  the  interbank  payment  system  Target  2, 
which  broadly  correspond  to  EMU  countries’ 
cumulated  current  account  positions  since  the 
introduction  of  the  euro  (see  the  illustration 
below;  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  Target2 
balances, see Sinn & Wollmershäuser, 2012). 
German  life  insurance  companies  and  the 
(relatively  small)  pension  funds  manage 
investments of about 1 200 billion euro (about 50% 
of GDP). However, over 85% of that investment is 
domestic  with  only  15%  international,  of  which 
less than 5% outside the euro area. It is thus clear 
that  the  private  sector  has  de  facto  been  either 
unable or unwilling to invest the German savings 
surplus abroad. 
                                                   
1 Moreover, in 2010, Germany recorded total net capital 
exports of €145.8 billion and net capital exports to its EMU 
partners  of  €603.5  billion,  suggesting  that  its  financial 
institutions  not  only  moved  German  savings  to  other 
EMU countries but also intermediated capital flows from 
abroad to them. 
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The Eurosystem is not alone 
The role of the Eurosystem in intermediating large 
private-sector  savings  surpluses  should  not  be 
regarded as abnormal. On the contrary, there are 
very few examples of countries with consistently 
large  external  surpluses  being  intermediated  for 
long periods exclusively by the private sector. In 
most countries running persistent current account 
surpluses (say, above 3% of GDP for more than 5 
years),  the  government  or  the  central  bank  has 
accumulated large foreign assets either through a 
sovereign  wealth  fund  or  through  foreign 
exchange intervention. In raw-material exporting 
countries, where the external surplus is generated 
by  the  royalties  that  go  to  the  government,  the 
sovereign  wealth  fund  is  the  natural  choice.  In 
countries where the external surplus arises from 
excess  savings  in  the  private  sector,  foreign 
exchange intervention is the usual route to absorb 
the  risk  arising  from  the  large  net  foreign  asset 
position the private sector is accumulating. Saudi 
Arabia and Norway provide the classic examples 
of  natural  resources-based  surpluses 
intermediated  by  the  public  sector  through  a 
sovereign wealth fund. 
Switzerland and Japan can illustrate the tendency 
of  countries  with  structural  private-sector 
surpluses  to  rely  on  the  central  bank.  Both 
countries have (or, as in the case of Switzerland, 
had) officially fluctuating exchange rates. Most of 
the time the authorities of these countries did not 
intervene,  forcing  the  private  sector  to 
intermediate  at  least  part  of  their  persistent 
current  account  surpluses.  However,  this 
approach  led  at  irregular  intervals  to  extreme 
exchange rate movements which then induced the 
authorities  to  make  large  interventions  to  avoid 
‘excessive’  exchange  rate  movements.  In  those 
contexts, ‘excessive’ meant that the exchange rate 
that  would  have  established  a  balanced  current 
account was politically unacceptable at home. 
If  one  average  over  periods  of  calm  (no 
intervention)  and  those  with  spikes  in  the 
exchange  rate  (followed  by  interventions),  one 
finds  that  over  longer  periods  the  sum  of  the 
interventions is of a similar order of magnitude as 
the sum of the current account surpluses over the 
same period. This observation is supported by a 
recent  study  by  Joseph  Gagnon  (2012)  of  the 
Peterson  Institute  for  International  Economics, 
who  finds  that  for  developed  countries  foreign 
exchange intervention ‘finances’ about two-thirds 
of  current  account  surpluses  on  average  in  the 
longer  term.  The  similarities  to  the  Target2 
positions are obvious. 
However, the use of central banks to intermediate 
structural  private-sector  savings  surpluses 
becomes less and less attractive in the current zero 
interest  rate  environment.  Central  banks  are 
usually  obliged  to  invest  only  in  short-term 
securities  of  the  highest  investment  ratings. 
However, the interest rates on this type of security 
(essentially  short-term  government  bonds  or 
government-guaranteed securities) paper from the 
few remaining AAA countries are now zero, if not 
slightly  negative  almost  everywhere.  Some 
countries have thus recently started to encourage 
their  central  banks  to  diversify  their  investment 
policies.  For  example,  China  has  also  now 
established a fund that will invest part of its more 
than $3,000 billion of foreign exchange reserves in 
other  ways,  including  in  very  non-liquid  assets, 
such as foreign direct investment. 
From exchange rate to credit risk 
Central banks in countries with strong currencies 
are  always  reluctant  to  undertake  large  foreign 
exchange  interventions  because  they  know  that 
they are running a foreign exchange rate risk. But 
within  EMU,  the  TARGET2  balances  of  national 
central  banks  within  the  cross-border  payment 
system  of  the  ECB  are  the  equivalent  of  foreign 
exchange  interventions.  Here  the  risk  is  of  a 
different  nature:  namely that  of  the  default  of a 
peripheral country. Politically this makes a world 
of a difference. Consider the case where a central 
bank  loses  a  bundle  on  foreign  exchange  rate 
interventions (e.g. Switzerland where the central 
bank recorded in 2011 losses of about €20 billion 
or  close  to  4%  of  GDP  during  its  unsuccessful 
attempt to stem the rise of the Swiss Franc). This 
made headlines in some newspapers, but because 
these losses existed only on the balance sheet of 
the central bank, which can cover its losses with 
the printing press, the topic was soon relegated to 
the specialized press. By contrast, one can easily 
imagine the political uproar in Europe if the ECB 
were to make losses of €400 billion (an equivalent 
amount  in  relation  to  euro  area  GDP)  on  its 
lending  to  banks  in  peripheral  countries.  Given 
the loss-sharing provisions in the ECB, this would 
translate into losses of about €100 billion for the 
Bundesbank.  As  a  share  of  GDP  this  would  be 
similar to the foreign exchange losses of the Swiss 
National Bank, but if this scenario materialized, it 4 | GROS & MAYER 
 
could  well  mean  the  end  of  the  euro  and 
European integration.2 
The forerunner of EMU, the European Monetary 
System, had elaborate rules concerning who was 
obliged  to  intervene  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets,  which  were  generally  asymmetric, 
putting the burden mainly on the weaker currency 
countries. The more these countries tried to dis-
inflate by keeping their exchange rate against the 
DM from devaluing, the more the system became 
dominated by the Bundesbank. The system then 
broke  down  in  the  early  1990s  when  the 
Bundesbank had  to  tighten policy  in  the  face  of 
the post-unification boom in Germany while the 
other  countries  were  entering  a  recession.  By 
contrast,  within  the  euro  area,  the  TARGET2 
balances,  which  are  the  equivalent  to  foreign 
exchange  interventions  in  the  EMS,  work 
automatically in a symmetric manner. By design, 
the aggregate stance of the system is determined 
by the ECB, not the Bundesbank. In terms of the 
stance  of  monetary  policy,  EMU  is  thus  a 
symmetric  system.3  At  least  in  this  regard,  one 
could  say  that  the  French  and  other  politicians 
who pressed for EMU to break the power of the 
Bundesbank have achieved their goal. 
Diversification is key 
If  there  is  indeed  a  role  for  the  public  sector  to 
intermediate very large surplus savings, then the 
question  arises  whether  this  intermediation  is 
done  in  an  efficient  way.  From  a  German 
perspective, intermediation by the Eurosystem on 
balance is inefficient. On the one hand, any credit 
risk  incurred  by  the  Bundesbank  through  the 
accumulation of Target2 claims against the ECB is 
                                                   
2 A loss of €400 billion for the ECB represents an extreme 
scenario as it would require a full-scale default of at least 
three to four of the peripheral countries with close to zero 
recovery. The magnitude of the potential losses resulting 
from lending abroad is thus actually lower within the euro 
area,  but  their  political  impact  would  be  radically 
different. 
3 The system can even become asymmetrical in favour of 
deficit  countries  when  the  ECB  extends  loans at  a  fixed 
rate against a wide range of collateral and full allocation of 
bids to banks in deficit countries, which use these loans to 
fund  the  countries’  balance-of-payments  deficit  vis-à-vis 
other EMU countries. In this case, money created in the 
deficit  countries  flows  through  the  ECB’s  cross-border 
payment  system  to  the  surplus  countries,  where  it  will 
eventually push up the price level when it finds its way 
into the real economy. 
shared  with  other  EMU  countries  through  the 
distribution of any losses according to the share of 
countries in the capital of the ECB. On the other 
hand, the Target claims represent a portfolio that 
is  geographically  undiversified  and  only  a  little 
diversified  across  asset  classes.  In  the  event,  the 
Target2 claims are only backed by the securities of 
banks  in  deficit  countries  delivered  as  collateral 
for ECB credits under the various credit facilities. 
A  large  part  of  these  securities  is  probably  of 
dubious quality. 
Moreover,  the  ECB  offers  German  banks,  and 
hence indirectly the country’s savers, at present a 
nominal  interest  rate  of  zero  (which  may  even 
move into negative territory in the future), and it 
demands only 75 bps on its lending to banks in 
the  euro  area  periphery.  A  'margin'  of  75  bps 
seems totally insufficient to cover the risks taken 
in  the  ECB’s  operations.  Also,  the  zero  nominal 
interest rate offered by the ECB's deposit facility 
translates into a negative real return for German 
savers of around 2% per annum when the ECB’s 
target inflation rate prevails in Germany. And it 
could  be  even  less  when  German  inflation  rises 
above the ECB’s target (as would seem necessary 
to allow internal real exchange rate adjustment in 
EMU). Finally, the ECB (by its nature as a central 
bank)  is  not  able  to  offer  German  savers  any 
longer-  term  investment  vehicles.  This  is  a  key 
drawback  given  the  lack  of  long-term  savings 
vehicles  available  now  because  most  German 
government  debt  has  been  absorbed  by  foreign 
central  banks  (e.g.  from  Switzerland  and China) 
and sovereign wealth funds. 
An SWF to handle Germany’s excessive 
savings?  
An  alternative  to  the  present  system  of 
intermediation  of  the  German  savings  surplus, 
which  would  avoid  the  above-mentioned 
disadvantages,  would  be  a  German  Sovereign 
Wealth  Fund  (DESWF).4  Imagine  that  a 
                                                   
4  This  idea  could  of  course  be  applied  also  by  other 
countries with structural surpluses. Switzerland would 
be a prime candidate: instead of buying low-yielding 
euro  assets,  the  Swiss  National  Bank  should  be 
empowered to invest the country's gigantic surpluses 
(13%  of  GDP)  globally.  Over  the  last  year  the  Swiss 
National  Bank  has  bought  hundreds  of  billions  of 
euros, most of which were invested in German assets. 
The way the Swiss authorities are keeping the exchange 
rate  of  the  Swiss  Franc  low  at  present  is  thus AN SWF TO LIFT GERMANY’S CURSE OF EXCESS SAVINGS | 5 
 
government agency would offer German savers a 
secure  vehicle  paying  a  guaranteed  positive 
minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when 
real  investment  returns  allowed.  The  vehicle 
would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly 
diversified  by  geography  and  asset  classes. 
Positive real returns can be expected in the long 
run based on positive real global growth. Since, in 
this  case,  a  significant  amount  of  funds  would 
flow  outside  the  euro  area,  the  euro  would 
depreciate.  This  would  help  crisis  countries 
presently  struggling  to  revive  growth  through 
exports and to close their external deficits so as to 
recoup  their  international  credit-worthiness. 
Target imbalances would gradually disappear and 
German claims abroad would move from nominal 
claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal 
claims  on  various  private  and  public  foreign 
entities in a variety of asset classes. 
Investments  into  the  German  sovereign  wealth 
fund  could  be  restricted  to  longer-term 
commitments, thereby helping to achieve positive 
real  returns  through  participation  in  global 
growth  and  the  creation  of  a  funded  old-age 
pension scheme  as  a supplement  to  the existing 
German  pay-as-you  go  scheme.  The  DESWF 
would  of  course  carry  the  investment  risk, 
including the exchange rate risk, but its ability to 
deploy  large  amounts  of  funds  globally  with  a 
long-term investment horizon would put it into a 
better  position  to  handle  these  risks  than 
individual  investors  or  private  financial 
institutions.  The  latter  either  pass  the  exchange 
rate risk on to their customers or, if they cannot do 
this, avoid it because of regulatory requirements 
or in order to save equity capital that would be 
needed as risk buffer. 
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund could 
serve  as model  (for  details,  see  Velculescu).  The 
purpose of the fund, now standing at close to $600 
billion is to accumulate government savings from 
oil  royalties  to  meet  future  public  pension 
expenditures. The targeted real return of the fund 
is  4%  per  annum.  Between  1997  and  2011,  the 
actual real return was 2.7% on average. In view of 
the difficult  investment environment during this 
period,  this  seems  to  be  a  respectable 
                                                                                       
contributing  materially  to  the  build-up  of  the  Target 
imbalances, thus exacerbating the tensions within the 
euro area.  The creation of a Swiss Sovereign Wealth 
Fund  would  thus  constitute  a  further  important 
element of stabilization.  
achievement,  much  higher  than  the  slightly 
negative  real  return  that  can  be  expected  from 
long-term  German government  bonds  (see Press 
Release of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance of 
30 March 2012). 
Another  model  might  be  the  GIC  of  Singapore 
(another country with structural current account 
surpluses).  On  its  $300  billion  investments,  this 
fund has achieved on a rolling basis over the last 
20 years a real return of close to 4%. Even over the 
last  5  years  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  (nominal) 
rate  of  return  in  USD  has  been  3.4%  (see 
SWFinstitute, 2012). 
A  German  SWF  would  be  funded  by  German 
private-sector  savings  instead  of  government 
savings and hence have some similarity to a life 
insurance  company.5  However,  in  contrast  to 
private life insurance companies, its focus would 
be on foreign investment outside the euro area to 
intermediate German surplus savings and acquire 
foreign assets on behalf of its domestic investors, a 
task  for  which  existing  private  life  insurance 
companies are presently ill-equipped (and to some 
extent even not allowed to undertake, given the 
constraints on foreign investment inherent in EU 
directives like Solvency II).6 
There is no investment without risk. One could of 
course object to our proposal  for an DESWF on 
the  grounds  that  it  will  create  risk  for  the 
government. But at present a large part of German 
savings  is  de  facto  invested  via  a  German  state 
institution  (the  Bundesbank)  in  the  euro  area 
periphery  –  which  is  not  exactly  the  most 
promising  investment  area  right  now.  By 
diversifying  the  destination  of  German  savings 
globally,  the  overall  risk  for  the  country  should 
actually be reduced. Moreover, critics could argue 
that it would be preferable to have private sector 
                                                   
5  The  Netherlands  is  running  an  even  larger  current 
account  surplus  as  a  percent  of  GDP  than  Germany. 
But  its  pension  funds  are  de  facto  operating  like  a 
sovereign  wealth  fund  as  they  are  investing  almost 
one-half of their assets, now worth about 130% of GDP, 
outside the euro area. 
6  German  life  insurance  companies  and  the  (relatively 
small) pension funds manage investments of about €1,200 
billion (about  50%  of GDP).  However,  over  85%  of  that 
investment  is  domestic  with  only  15%  international,  of 
which less than 5% is outside the euro area.  It is thus clear 
that the private sector has de facto been either unable or 
unwilling to invest the German savings surplus abroad. 6 | GROS & MAYER 
 
funding  of  the  German  current  account  surplus 
rather  than  a  sovereign  wealth  fund.  We  would 
agree, but see at present no possibility to quickly 
reopen  private  sector  channels  for  capital  flows; 
and hence see the risk that the inefficient way of 
funding  through  the  Eurosystem  becomes 
engrained  with  the  consequence  of  escalating 
political  controversies.  Finally,  critics  will  argue 
that  the  first  best  solution  would  be  German 
current  account  adjustment.  We  wholeheartedly 
agree but have little hope that what has remained 
elusive for so long in the past will now happen fast 
under even more difficult circumstances. 
How  large  should  the  DESWF  become?  Under 
present  circumstances,  we  would  argue  that  it 
should  aim  to  invest  around  one-half  of  the 
German current account surplus outside Europe, 
which  would  amount  to  a  flow  of  about  €80 
billion  per  annum,  which  is  equivalent  to 
somewhat  more  than  3%  of  the  country’s  GDP. 
Should the current account surplus continue at the 
present  magnitude,  the  DESWF  could  grow  to 
€800 billion, or 30% of Germany’s GDP within the 
next ten years. 
Our concern in this brief has been to present the 
macroeconomic  arguments  for  the  establishment 
of  an  SWF  by  Germany.  We  leave  to  others  the 
elaboration  of  the  legal  and  institutional  details. 
We  believe  that  the  DESWF  does  not  need  to 
become a large institution. It could outsource the 
investment  decisions  to  competing  private 
institutions  (in  the  form  of  so-called 
“Spezialfonds”),  which  is  a  practice  adopted  by 
other successful SWFs around the globe. 
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•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
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Politics and Institutions 
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Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
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European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 